This paper studies correlation in discounted in…nitely repeated games with public monitoring. Two extensions of the perfect public equilibrium are proposed: the public correlated equilibrium, where a correlation device sends private correlated messages to the players at the beginning of each period, and the public augmented equilibrium, where the device also publicly informs the players of the recommended action pro…le at the end of each period. The set of public correlated equilibrium payo¤s is compared to the set of subgame perfect publicly correlated equilibrium payo¤s in the perfect monitoring case. It is shown that augmented correlation produces e¢ ciency gains in the repeated partnership game by Radner et al. (1986) .
Introduction
This paper studies discounted in…nitely repeated n-player games with public monitoring, endowed with an extensive form correlation device. This structure captures situations of repeated interaction among players who choose their actions conditional on both public and correlated private information.
A general framework for the analysis of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring was provided by Abreu et al. (1990) (APS) . Building on their work, have shown that imperfect monitoring imposes essentially no restriction on the set of equilibrium payo¤s if the signal space is large enough.
Otherwise, the equilibrium payo¤ set may be bounded away from the Pareto frontier even as the discount factor tends to one (Radner et al. 1986; Fudenberg at al. , pp. 1003 . This ine¢ ciency disappears if communication among players is allowed and the number of players is at least four (Kandori 2003) . Sometimes e¢ ciency can be improved by employing private strategies which depend not only on the history of public signals but also on players'own actions in the past (Kandori and Obara 2006a) . Another approach to dealing with the ine¢ cency problem is based on assuming reduced sensitivity of the public signal to the hidden actions of the players (Kandori and Obara 2006b ).
The focus of this paper is also on in…nitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Following Forges (1986) and Lehrer (1992) , we add an extensive form correlation device to the in…nitely repeated game. The device selects a vector of messages, one for each player, in every period of the game, based on the history of public signals. In our setting, the device is not a communication device since it does not receive any inputs from players (Myerson 1986; Tomala 2005) . Players condition their play in every period on (i) the history of public signals and (ii) the 3 latest private message of the device. The distribution according to which the device randomly selects its recommendations in every period depends only on the history of realizations of the public signal. As a result, each non-empty public history may be treated as if it gives rise to a proper subgame. In repeated games with perfect monitoring, a related solution concept is that of subgame perfect publicly correlated equilibrium by Myerson (1991, p. 334) , where, in every period, the correlation device publicly recommends an action pro…le to the players.
In the APS spirit, we decompose an equilibrium payo¤ vector into an admissible pair consisting of a probability distribution on the product of the players' action sets and a continuation value function. This extension leads to a number of useful characterizations of the set of public correlated equilibrium payo¤s.
We then introduce augmented correlation devices. In every period, these devices …rst send players private recommendations and, after the players have moved, publicly inform them of the whole recommended action pro…le. Obviously, in the perfect monitoring case, the corresponding equilibrium payo¤ set contains both the set of public correlated equilibrium payo¤s and the set of subgame perfect public randomization (publicly correlated) equilibrium payo¤s. However, the opportunities opened up by augmented correlation are not con…ned to introducing public randomization e¤ects into the model. Augmentation enriches public histories with previously recommended action pro…les and makes it easier to identify deviators.
A similar enrichment of public histories results from asking the players to publicly announce which actions they have just taken at the end of each period. However, ensuring players'truth telling leads to additional conditions on the number of players (Kandori 2003) . In its turn, augmentation is not about the action pro…le just chosen by the players: the mediator publicly announce its own private recommendations to the players at the end of each period. As we will show below by example, such "leaks" of players' private information may lead to improved e¢ ciency in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring.
In Example 1, we study an in…nitely repeated prisoners'dilemma game with perfect monitoring. For a …xed discount factor, we show that the corresponding set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo¤s is a proper subset of the set of public correlated equilibrium payo¤s. That is, imperfect correlation may produce more e¢ cient outcomes than perfect correlation. The intution behind this is that of Aumann (1974) 's, but applied to the in…nitely repeated game. At the same time, it is worth noting that the stage game of the repeated game has a unique Nash equilibrium. In general, the set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo¤s may strictly contain the set of public correlated equilibrium payo¤s since the history of past public messages is common knowledge in the presence of a public randomization device.
As we show for an in…nitely repeated prisoners'dilemma game (Example 2), extensive form correlation alone may produce no e¢ ciency improvement if public monitoring is imperfect and the signal space is small. However, by publicly announcing the most recent private recommendations at the end of each period, the mediator can reduce the welfare loss caused by the imperfect observability of actions.
Theoretical Underpinnings
In the stage game G Y ; players move simultaneously, and player i 2 N = f1; : : : ; ng chooses an action a i from a …nite set A i . Every pro…le of actions a 2 A = Players discount future payo¤s with a common discount factor 2 (0; 1); and player i's objective is to maximize
where a k refers to the action pro…le chosen in period k: Adding the subscript "Y "
to G emphasizes that actions are imperfectly observed. However, the formulation also encompasses the case of perfect observability of actions. So, with a slight abuse of notation, we will denote by g i player i's payo¤ function in repeated games with perfectly observable actions as well.
Correlation Devices
An extensive form correlation device C sends separately and con…dentially messages to the players at the beginning of each period. 
represent the probability that player i will choose a i conditional on h Y and m i . For a correlation device C and a strategy pro…le f = (f 1 ; : : : ; f n ), we can compute the following:
= fy 0 ; : : : ; y k g will take place in the …rst k periods
and player i's expected average discounted payo¤
Having the players'set of strategies and payo¤ functions de…ned, we denote this extended repeated game by G 1 C ( ). Then an extensive form correlated equilibrium of
De…nition 1 An extensive form correlated equilibrium
sisting of an extensive form correlation device C and a strategy pro…le f such that the strategy pro…le is a Nash equilibrium of the extended game induced by the device,
Further on, we will focus on public correlated equilibria that for each period k and public history h k Y yield a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding extended game from that period on.
For any correlation device C, strategy pro…le f , and history h Y ; we denote by
De…nition 2 An extensive form correlated equilibrium
Given a strategy pro…le f and a correlation device C, player i's expected average discounted payo¤ at h Y 2 H Y can be represented as
The following statement is the one-shot deviation principle for in…nitely repeated games with public monitoring and extensive form correlation.
Proposition 1 A pair (C; f ) consisting of an extensive form correlation device
) and a strategy pro…le f = (f 1 ; : : : ; f n ), 
Because of discounting, the proof of Proposition 1 reduces to a conventional backward induction argument.
It is useful to note that the revelation principle holds in this setting. An extensive It follows from the revelation principle for normal form games and Proposition 1.
So further on, we assume that every extensive form correlation device added to G and u i ( jh Y ; ) player i's expected average discounted payo¤ in a public direct corre-
and
By de…nition,
That is, if v 2 V C ( ), there exist a probability distribution 2 4(A), a function
: : : ; n; and no player has incentive to disobey any possible recommendation by the device. This observation is key to obtaining a number of powerful characterizations of V C ( ).
De…nition 3 Given 2 (0; 1), for any W R n , a pair ( ; ), where is a probability distribution on A, is a function from Y to W , is called C-admissible with respect
For W R n , we de…ne (1 ) i (a i ; y)+ i (y)); i = 1; : : : ; n;
for some pair ( ; ) C-admissible w.r.t. W g.
It is obvious that
set. The proofs of the just mentioned properties are similar to those provided by APS for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring.
Augmented Correlation Devices
We now introduce devices that send players correlated private messages at the beginning of each stage and, after they have moved, publicly inform all of them of the whole recommended action pro…le. As a result, public histories also include past public messages. As we show below, the opportunities provided by such devices are not con…ned to correlation and public randomization. As before, an extensive form augmented direct correlation device D can be described
It sends messages to players twice every period. First, it separately and con…dentially recommends an action to each player and then, after the players have moved, it publicly announces the recommended action pro…le. Now the device's recommendations may stochastically depend not only on previously observed public signals but also on its own past recommendations.
A strategy for player i is a map
denote the probability that player i will choose action a i according to f i conditional on h D 2 H D and d i 2 A i . For an extensive form augmented correlation device D and a strategy pro…le f = (f 1 ; : : : ; f n ), one can compute player i's expected average discounted payo¤ u i (f j ; D):
is a pair consisting of an extensive form augmented direct correlation device D and an obedient strategy pro…le f such that the strategy pro…le is a Nash equilibrium of the extended game induced by the device, that is,
De…nition 5 An extensive form augmented correlated equilibrium
The following statement describes the recursive structure of a public augmented 
We denote by V D ( ) the set of public augmented equilibrium payo¤s of
The de…nitions of an admissible pair and the self-generating operator for the case of augmented correlation are straightforward. Let, for a i 2 A i ; d 2 A; i 2 N; and
De…nition 6 Given 2 (0; 1), for any W R n , a pair ( ; ), where is a probability distribution on A, is a function from A Y to W , is called D-admissible with respect
for some pair ( ; ) D admissible w.r.t. W g.
As usual, the self-generation property holds: if W is a bounded subset of
It is also not di¢ cult to show that V D ( ) is a compact subset of R n : Clearly, disclosing private information at the end of each period introduces public randomization e¤ects in the model. Moreover, augmentation may also contribute to e¢ ciency, which is illustrated in Example 2.
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Two Examples
In this section, we consider two in…nitely repeated games with public monitoring. In
Example 1, we show that partial correlation may produce more e¢ cient outcomes than public randomization in an in…nitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game with perfect monitoring. The intuition behind the e¢ ciency improvement is the same as in Aumann (1974)'s Example 2.6. However, here it is applied to an in…nitely repeated prisoners'dilemma game, in which the stage game has a unique corelated equilibrium.
To begin with, we provide some notation for the perfect monitoring case.
The de…nition of a C admissible pair simpli…es to the following: A pair ( ; ),
where is a probability distribution on A, is a function from A to W , is C-admissible
The self-generating operator can be represented as follows:
In Example 1, the set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo¤s is a proper subset of the set of public correlated equilibrium payo¤s. . Following Stahl (1991) , one can show that, if 2 [
), the set V P ( ) of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo¤s is the triangle T = cof(0; 2 b); (2 b; 0); (0; 0)g: Here coX denotes the convex hull of X:
).
), consider the continuation value function = ( (U; L); (U; R); We now show that imperfect correlation can produce more e¢ cient outcomes than perfect correlation in the repeated game.
Claim 2 As goes to 1 2 from below, the distance between V C ( ) and (1; 1) goes to zero.
Proof. Let x 2 (0; 1): Suppose that the payo¤ vector (x; x) can be supported by a pair ( ; ); where (U; L) = (x; x), (U; R) = (2 b; 0), (D; L) = (0; 2 b), (D; R) = (0; 0); and = ( U L ; U R ; DL ; DR ) is a probability distribution on A such that U R = DL > 0; DR = 0. The game is symmetric, so we look at it from player 1's point of view. The fact that (x; x) can be supported by ( ; ) means that
and the following two incentive constraints hold:
Solving (1) for x, we get
The constraint (2) implies that
and, therefore,
Since
we deduce by continuity that for any …xed U R > 0 there exists ( U R ) < . It is not di¢ cult to see that x(b; ( U R ); U R ) approaches 1 as U R goes to 0.
Adding a public randomization device to an in…nitely repeated game is accompanied by rede…ning the notion of public history, with a public history including not only the history of previously chosen action pro…les but also the history of past public messages. As a result, it is easy to …nd an example where the set V P ( ) of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payo¤s strictly contains the set V C ( ) of public correlated equilibrium payo¤s. Moreover, V C ( ) need not be convex and monotonic in (Prokopovych and Smith 2004) , which comes as no suprise since the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤s possesses these properties as well.
In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, the set of perfect public equilibrium payo¤s may be bounded away from the Pareto frontier uniformly in the discount rates if the signal space is small (Radner et al. 1986 ). We will show that augmentation, unlike extensive correlation alone, produces e¢ ciency gains in the game.
The fact that players'future payo¤s may also depend on the device's recommenda- ; if only one works the probability ; p(b j
; and p(b j D; R) = 0: Given 2 (0; 1); we denote by V ( ) the set of perfect public equilibrium payo¤s of this game. A reasoning similar to that provided by can be employed to show that the limit set V L = lim First we show that, even with an extensive form correlation device C added, the players' average discounted equilibrium payo¤s sum to no more than 1. The proof of this statement is similar to that provided by for perfect public equilibrium payo¤s. 
Since ( ) > 1, puts positive probability on the action pro…le (U; L). Player 1's second incentive constraint is omitted because it has no bearing on the below reasoning.
It follows from (6) that
Substituting for 1 (s) in (5), we have
By symmetry,
This leads to the conclusion that v 1 + v 2 ( ); which contradicts the initial assumption.
Adding an extensive form correlation device to the repeated game does not make available public information richer. Moreover, the signal space is too poor for the correlation to have any e¢ ciency-improving e¤ect. At the same time, adding an augmented correlation device to the game improves e¢ ciency because its payo¤-irrelevant recommendations enrich public histories, and, as a result, future payo¤s may depend on both the history of realized public signals and the history of the device's payo¤-irrelevant recommendations.
Claim 4 For all 2 [ 3 4
; 1); the set T = cof(0; 0); (0; 1); (1; 0)g is strictly contained in
Proof. We …rst show that T V D ( ) for 2 [ 3 4
disclosing private payo¤-irrelevant messages at the end of each period makes e¢ ciency improvements possible.
